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Abstract—Security managers define policies and procedures
to express how employees should behave to ‘do their bit’ for
information security. They assume these policies are compatible
with the business processes and individual employees’ tasks
as they know them. Security managers usually rely on the
‘official’ description of how those processes are run; the day-
to-day reality is different, and this is where security policies
can cause friction. Organisations need employees to participate
in the construction of workable security, by identifying where
policies causes friction, are ambiguous, or just do not apply.
However, current efforts to involve employees in security act to
identify employees who can be local representatives of policy
— as with the currently popular idea of ‘security champions’ —
rather than as a representative of employee security needs.
Towards helping organisations ‘close the loop’ and get input
from employees, we have conducted employee surveys on
security in the context of their specific jobs. The paper presents
results from secondary analysis of one such survey in a large
commercial organisation. The analysis of 608 responses finds
that attitude to policy and behaviour types — the prevailing
security cultures — vary greatly in the organisation and across
four business divisions examined in further detail. There is a
role in contributing to the effectiveness of security policies not
only for those who follow policy, but also for those who question
policy, socialise solutions, or expect security to justify itself as
a critical part of their productive work. This demonstrates that
security champions cannot be uniform across the organisation,
but rather that organisations should re-think the role of security
champions as diverse ‘bottom-up’ agents to change policy for
the better, rather than communicators of existing ‘top-down’
policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security managers in large organisations will define
policies to encourage a shared approach to IT security for
all members of the organisation. Policies can refer to a mix
of procedures and technical controls, which employees in
the organisation will interact with, and are expected to use
according to the rules of the policy.
∗Authors contributed equally.
The promotion of security champions is seen as a way
to find local representatives who can promote and monitor
security policy at a local level, acting as an extension
of company’s security management team [12]. However,
security champions may only be effective in this way if the
policy itself is workable [6].
This brings us to examine the role of policy effectiveness
from the perspective of security usability. Employees may
feel that policy is too cumbersome, that it actually asks
the impossible of them, or that the relevance of security
mandates to their work is unclear [16]. This can then lead to
deliberate or unwitting non-compliance, and workarounds
to prescribed security processes. We look to explore the way
that the organisation can engage employees, to give them
a role in identifying and solving shortcomings of security
policy.
We build on a prior security behaviour survey [4] de-
ployed at a large partner organisation (employing thousands
of staff). The survey presented scenario-based questions
to 600+ employees, where scenarios and related security
dilemmas were based on in-depth interviews with employ-
ees at the same organisation. Interview responses were
crafted into survey questions grounded in the realities of
working with the security procedures and technologies in
the company. The survey was designed so that an em-
ployee’s responses would indicate a combination of be-
haviour type and security attitude. Distinct behaviour types
included Egalitarian, Fatalist, Individualist, and Hierarchist
(based on work in the area of risk culture [1]). Security
attitude followed a scale defined within a security behaviour
maturity model; the model moves from an employee being
‘uninfluenced’ by security policy, up to an ‘active approach
to security’.
We analyse the 608 survey responses by combining the
two dimensions of security behaviour and security maturity
as a representation of individual security posture and the
wider security culture. We analyse responses across the
organisation and in four specific business divisions (Sales &
Services, Operations, Business, and Finance & Professional
Services). Analysis allows us to draw conclusions through
aggregation and statistical validations for larger business
divisions and the organisation as a whole. As part of the
survey 267 participants chose to elaborate their choices
by giving additional free-text responses, not previously
analysed. We combine both the two-dimensional security
culture dataset and the free-text responses, conducting a
novel analysis of the dependencies between maturity levels
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and behaviour types in the organisation. Such an approach
can identify local pockets of security expertise and indicate
how to engage with those employees to create workable
security solutions.
We find that there is a role in the development of
effective — and secure — organisation security policies
for employees who not only follow and promote policy,
but also those who: question the adequacy of policy, or
challenge it through finding alternative solutions; socialise
security solutions through engagement with peers, and;
those who would expect security to justify itself by being
a critical part of their productive work. These findings
demonstrate that organisations can find a range of security
champions if they engage with distinct viewpoints on policy.
We find that investing solely in security champions who
rigidly follow policy misses opportunities to involve the
wider organisation in the shaping of effective and work-
able security. Separate business divisions exhibited different
mixes of both behaviour-type and attitude-level; employee
feedback identified local challenges and framed alternative
security solutions in a manner that could be related to the
expectations of policy.
The paper is arranged as follows: Section II discusses
related work and the motivation for the analysis described
here. Section III summarises the survey methodology and
describes the analysis method used for exploring the differ-
ent roles a security leader or champion might have. Results
of the analysis are described in Section IV, followed by
discussion of the findings in Section V, with conclusions
and future directions closing the paper in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Related work
A number of works have explored factors and activ-
ities within organisations which can influence individual
compliance with security policies, implying that the act
of declaring a security policy does not in itself guarantee
compliance. A survey of works in this area by Sommestad
et al. [26] implies that factors such as perceived behavioural
control and the types of training delivered around policy are
reliable predictors of compliance, summarising that for an-
ticipating compliance constructs for values and norms are
more effective than systems around sanctions and rewards.
Here we consider ways to engage with characteristics of
organisational and security culture at scale, toward aligning
individual security responsibility and the accessibility of
provisioned security systems. In this regard, some works
consider the role of ‘security champions’ as role models
within distinct groups of employees, as examples that others
can follow.
Connolly et al. [8] explore the role of deterrent factors
in organisational security and the minimisation of ‘human
error’. The authors examine how organisational culture,
national culture, and security countermeasures can influ-
ence employee security behaviours. Where employees are
encouraged to make local decisions and voice their opinions
within the organisation, they are more likely to comply
with security policies and procedures. Excluding employees
from the conversation around security encourages non-
compliance. Compliant behaviours may also rest on secure
working being an integral value of the organisation, and
the visible presence of countermeasures such as policy and
security training. Here we explore how different security
cultures can be engaged for their strengths, alongside the
provision of controls and the promotion of security skills.
Posey et al. [22] consider the differences between in-
formation security professionals and other employees in
organisations, in terms of their perceptions around security.
Security professionals consider workarounds by employees
as a threat to the organisation, where here we consider
whether such activities — essentially, deviation from what
professionals expect — are an opportunity for the organ-
isation to develop security which integrates naturally with
business processes. Posey et al. found that both security
professionals and other employees were concerned about
careless behaviour threatening the security of the organi-
sation, yet also noted the potential impact of improperly
provisioned technologies. It was found that security pro-
fessionals underestimated the negative impact that secu-
rity infrastructure had upon employees, and overestimated
employees’ tendency to distance themselves from security.
The authors note that future solutions could act to unify
the differences in views between security professionals and
employees, rather than determining which group is ‘correct’.
In their work, perceptions are framed around responses to
security events, where here the survey used to drive analysis
asks participants to choose amongst responses to scenarios;
both the scenario and the range of responses are based on
self-reports from employees.
Hsu et al. [14] examine extra-role security behaviours
— those not specified in the information security policy
recognised by the organisation. The influence of social
controls, rather than formal controls alone, is also explored.
The authors asserted that employee involvement in the
development of information security policy is critical, given
that ‘involvement’ is a foundational social control. The
authors also found that maintaining a mix of formal and
social controls can benefit an organisation. Here we explore
whether variations of following and challenging of policy
can be blended to benefit an organisation. Driving compli-
ance through formal controls only is seen to stifle extra-
role security behaviour. Combinations of security cultures
— security leaders — may be necessary to be able to
encourage both proactive security behaviour and allegiance
to the fundamentals principles of security policy.
Johnston et al. [15] deploy a scenario-based survey,
to 242 individuals with experience of using computers
and working in organisations with security procedures, to
examine how personality traits and derived perceptions of
situational factors (such as sanction certainty and threat
severity) determine an individual’s inclination toward policy
violation. The study focuses on specific dispositional factors,
those being stability and plasticity, and how these meta-
traits interact with the derived perceptions of sanctions,
threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Rather than arguing
in terms of dispositional factors, we use scenarios as an
experimental construct, to explore participants’ perceptions
around security. Individuals exhibiting Stability may con-
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form with rules, whereas those exhibiting Plasticity may take
more risks but only when there is seen to be a benefit in
doing so. The authors note that differing forms of persuasive
engagement may be necessary to target different personality
types, but that controls such as sanctions must be seen as
equally fair to all.
Furnell & Rajendran [11] develop a model of the
influences on security behaviour, relating workplace-based
influences and workplace-independent influences; colleague
behaviour is an element of workplace interactions, for
instance. By considering situational factors, the authors note
that factors such as fatigue and the perceived importance
of the primary task can impact the enactment of security
behaviours. It is further noted that intention to follow secu-
rity policy can be separate from factors such as the usability
of security controls. Based upon a focus group exercise
with a number of professionals, disciplinary procedures are
seen as a strong influential factor for compliance, but so
is colleague behaviour. Here we explore whether employees
and groups of employees, experiencing policy in practice,
can actively contribute to the identification and removal
of barriers which may otherwise undo any good intentions
towards security.
Similar work to [11], Gabriel & Furnell [12] explore
the characteristics of a ‘security champion’, positing that
awareness, motivation, and compliance are foundations for
defining a security champion, and further that the person-
ality of a security champion rests primarily on increased
imagination and minimising any tendency toward immod-
eration (i.e., fixation on short-term gains rather than long-
term consequences). Other factors such as Emotionality,
Anxiety, and Altruism were seen as positive elements of
a security champion, where here we discuss behaviour
types which frame characteristics like these in terms of
security culture and the connection to the rest of the
organisation. We consider with our security maturity levels
that employees have to balance their security competence
with a primary task, and that being a security champion
may be about finding workable security that allows them to
complete their primary, productive tasks in a secure way (for
instance limiting the need to make short-term compromises
by avoiding cumbersome security controls).
Beris et al. [6] identified sixteen theoretical behaviour
types based upon the analysis of semi-structured interviews
with staff in large organisations. The authors distinguish
between risk understanding and affective security. Risk
understanding is regarded as an individual’s competence,
and affective security the person’s emotional response to
security. One of the theoretical behaviour types identified
by Beris et al. is a ‘security champion’, someone who is
motivated to engage with security while also understanding
the risks relevant to their work. An awareness of relevant
risks is seen to allow security champions to repurpose
their skills to address situations not directly or explicitly
addressed by policy; this suggests potential in engaging with
staff to shape policy for the better.
B. Motivation
We combine insights from related work around secu-
rity policy compliance and organisation-based employee
engagement with prior work exploring human factors and
usability of security. This combination frames a set of new
challenges for anyone seeking to deliver effective security
policy compliance in larger organisations. These challenges
guide our analysis of the dynamics between an organi-
sation’s security function and its employees. We discuss
the benefits of employee participation in the evolution of
security policy, and how security champions can enable this
process.
Challenge 1: There is evidence that non-compliance with
policy is common, and that it occurs for reasons other
than ignorance of policy. A security champion must be
able to question policy and negotiate workable solutions,
rather than just communicate policy.
Security policies are designed to represent how poli-
cymakers believe employees should behave [16]. Similarly,
a focus on enforcing compliance perpetuates a value gap
between security managers and the wider organisation [2].
Pfleeger et al. [20] consider levers for behaviour change
based on research in economics, psychology, and sociology,
and conclude that values are the crucial ‘anchoring points’
on which both sides must agree for behavioural norms —
such as policies — to be accepted. There can be many
dimensions to these values, as defined in Jonathan Haight’s
2012 seminal work [13], such as Care vs. Harm and Liberty
vs. Oppression.
The organisation’s standpoint on these values must be
clear, so that employees can accept that they have to ‘do
the right thing’ by those values, that is, act in line with
the behavioural norms anchored in those values. This is
generally part of psychological contracts that Human Re-
sources departments develop and promote [9]. That means,
for instance, that employees are expected to care about the
organisation rather than harm it, and show loyalty to the or-
ganisation when someone asks them to reveal confidential
information in return for some form on inducement. But as
in all functional relationships, there needs to be reciprocity
— the power of those values depends on visible evidence
that the organisation demonstrably cares about employees
and is loyal to them. Pfleeger et al. stress that even constant
appeal to values cannot overcome lack of security hygiene, a
fact summarised by a UK government agency as “if security
doesn’t work for people, it doesn’t work”1.
Security champions then can only promote values and
associated policies if security policies are (1) workable, and
(2) can be understood as part of not harming the organ-
isation in the context of preventing information security
risks [6]. An employee faced with an ineffective policy
that undermines organisational productivity may resort to
shadow security [17], getting the job done while securing
against risks they know. We know from previous research
on workforce interactions with IT and IT security [17], [18]
that organisations can learn from the way that employees
alter security to fit with their productive tasks. An employee
championing security is someone whose efforts are driven
by the tenets of the organisation’s security policy, but who
1 “People: The Strongest Link”, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/people-
strongest-link
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may not necessarily be restricted to the policy as a hard set
of rules.
Challenge 2: The organisation must reflect on the existing
security policy from the perspective of employees, before
determining the kind of security champion that the or-
ganisation needs in order to engage employees effectively.
Bulgurcu et al. [7] posit that the quality and fairness
of an information security policy, as perceived by employ-
ees, are factors in employee security compliance. ‘Security
hygiene’, as defined by Pfleeger et al., is a combination
of workable security habits that also delivers effective risk
management to the level required by the organisation [20].
This can only be achieved if employees are involved in
shaping policy that they can adhere to. Otherwise, em-
ployees may wonder why policies or specific rules are
necessary, or abandon policy at the first sign of any friction
or contradiction with other goals [16].
Posey et al. [22] found in their interview-based study
that employees saw compliance with policy as adding ex-
cessive effort to the primary task, stifled the general working
environment, caused frustration or seemed difficult — and
potentially irrelevant — even with good intentions toward
security. Security policies and employee work activities must
then be considered as part of the same conversation, to
understand how security fits with the existing environment
from the ‘ground up’ rather than exclusively ‘top down’.
Challenge 3: A champion of workable security cannot be
a single person. Developing effective security requires a
mix of individuals who interpret, question, follow, and
promote security in different parts of the organisation.
Within large organisations, an individual employee’s ap-
proach to resolving friction with security may be deter-
mined by not only their own inclinations but also their
interactions with others around them [4], [6]. Not every
employee needs to be a ‘security champion’ but can still
be a useful resource for security, as for instance there may
be individuals who have knowledge of the risks affecting the
business, but who do not have the skill-set of a dedicated
security expert [6].
Equally, there can be employees for whom security is not
a natural part of the job, but a levy on productivity. This can
inadvertently perpetuate the myth that there is a ‘tradeoff’
between security and productivity [24]. In the realm of
safety, Dekker [10] deprecates the oft-expressed desire of
experts to ‘get people engaged’. He argues that the problem
is not that ‘operational people’ need to engage with safety,
but that “safety experts are not engaged with operational
people”. Dekker further refers to the work of Pink [21] in
that motivation to be safe involves autonomy, mastery, and
purpose. These elements together allude to a larger purpose
than safety, best served with an open dialogue around
workable behaviours and meaningful interaction between
experts and non-experts. Similar arguments may be applied
to security.
Employees who rigidly follow the rules are powerless in
situations where rules are unwritten or unclear. Organisa-
tions who want employees who can be a ‘hero’ who keeps
the organisation secure in unanticipated circumstances
need to enable them by supporting individual and collective
awareness of the risks and an understanding of actions that
could mitigate those effects [23].
Where security is important to the business, it will
enter the discourse of discussions between peers, who may
approach security as a social responsibility. Those who
are firmly part of the organisation — but not necessarily
‘on board’ with security — are nonetheless part of the
‘pulse’ of the organisation. A proactive security champion or
network of champions will find gaps in policy and process,
so the organisation must have the capability to approach
shortcomings in policy. This can nonetheless be done in
a way that aligns with the intent of the security policy,
where this is most naturally achieved through alignment
of security with the goals of the business.
III. METHODOLOGY
The methodology described here builds on a prior
security behaviour survey exercise with a large partner
organisation [4]. We re-interpret the survey responses and
examine the additional free-text comments that participants
provided, in line with the security engagement challenges
outlined in Section II-B.
A. Security behaviour survey development
The overarching methodology described in [4] is a multi-
stage process that begins with qualitative interviews themed
around security, conducted with a cross-section of employ-
ees. Outcomes ground security in the work environment,
motivating targeted, realistic survey questions that are rel-
evant to large parts of the organisation. This then serves
as a snapshot of the security culture of the organisation
across dimensions such as business function, location, and
employee age. It is designed to provide researchers with a
repeatable and scalable data gathering process for capturing
security behaviours of individuals and groups.
B. Attitude level and behaviour type scenarios
The survey consists of scenario-based questions which
present a security workplace dilemma to participants. The
available options correspond to attitude levels and be-
haviour types, which where attitude and behaviour were
analysed independently. The distinction between attitude-
level and behaviour-type is similar to the work of Beris et
al. [6], who compare risk understanding and affective secu-
rity (or ‘emotional stance’) to identify groups of employees
with skills and expertise that are potentially beneficial to
organisational security. Here we combine the dimensions
of attitude and behaviour, using them together to explore
whether distinct security cultures exist in an organisation
and different business divisions.
The behaviour types captured in the survey are
informed by an examination of risk culture by Adams [1],
and are summarised as:
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Individualists Rely on themselves for solutions to prob-
lems.
Egalitarians Rely on social or group solutions to problems.
Hierarchists Rely on existing systems or technologies for
solutions to problems.
Fatalists Take a ‘naive’ approach to solving problems, feel-
ing that their actions are not significant in creating
outcomes.
Attitude levels correspond to a security behaviour
maturity model underpinning the survey, as described
below (and in further detail in [4]).Each level describes the
relationship the individual has with the organisation and
its security policy, and in turn the role played by the whole
organisation and the employee in making secure working
viable. Those at lower levels engage with security as and
when necessary, and at higher levels employees are local
security experts:
Level 1: Uninfluenced Security behaviour is driven by
personal knowledge, instincts, goals and tasks, with no
influence from any security infrastructure.
Level 2: Technically Controlled Technical controls enforce
compliance with policy, outside of which employees
fall back on personal security rules.
Level 3: Ad-hoc Knowledge and Application Employees
adhere to a shallow understanding of policy. Security
knowledge is absorbed from the surrounding work
environment rather than from policy.
Level 4: Policy Compliant Comprehensive knowledge and
understanding of policy, and compliance with it, even
when not required to. Employees at this level can
be considered as role models and guides for security
culture within the organisation.
Level 5: Active Approach to Security Employees actively
promote and advance security culture. The intent of
policy is carried into work activities as a supporting
capability of the organisation. The values within se-
curity policy relative to organisation goals are under-
stood, driving respect for both security and business
processes.
Broadly speaking, individuals at Level 1 will not be
found in an organisational environment where a minimum
infrastructure typically requires employees to use a regis-
tered username and password to access IT resources. Survey
responses here then utilise Level 2 and upwards.
C. Free-text survey responses
A participant could provide additional comments on
each question, scenario and the available options, via an
associated free-text field in the survey. The security-work
dilemmas and answer options were based on a large-
scale interview study with employees at the same organ-
isation, and included an element of non-compliance or
an implicit cost that had been described and justified by
multiple interviewees. Participants may then feel that there
are other solutions available, informed by their local work
environment (and which the security function may not be
aware of). There was no direct incentive associated with
providing additional comments; where employees provided
further comment they were in effect being proactive toward
security.
D. Source data
608 complete survey responses were analysed. The sur-
vey captured business division, but also each participant’s
main place of work and age. We focus our analysis on
business division, since the security mechanisms and rules
that an employee interacts with vary with roles. Surveys
were distributed to seven business divisions (where one
was a group of smaller divisions) across a larger number
of physical locations. The majority of responses originated
from Sales & Services (292), followed by Operations (152).
The number of responses was approximately proportional
to the size of each of the divisions, but we were unable to
further control the sampling within each division.
Demographic information (including business role) was
captured at the start of the survey process and used to build
a set of 3-4 scenario-based questions for each respondent
based on their responses and split between attitude-level
and behaviour-type questions.
We complement analysis of the combined attitude-level
and behaviour-type with examination of the free-text re-
sponses. These responses also illustrate the kind of informa-
tion that security managers could use in policy formulation
should they involve employees — who may have differing
relationships with organisation security — more directly in
the process. This relies on security managers believing that
employees may adopt a range of security behaviours in the
workplace which are within and outside of policy, but that
this may be done in response to practical challenges in
fitting policy and other security mechanisms to the business
more effectively (as with ‘shadow security’ behaviours [18]).
IV. RESULTS — CULTURE ANALYSIS
IndividualistEgalitarian
Hierarchist FatalistLevel 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Fig. 1. Kiviat diagram of distributions of behaviour types for maturity
level 2 (red), 3 (blue), 4 (yellow), 5 (green) for the entire organisation.
As described in Section III, we cross-analyse behaviour
types with attitude levels for groups of employees. To
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support analysis and to visualise the data, we employ Kiviat
diagrams. Figure 1, for example, describes the distribution
of behaviour types and attitude levels for the entire or-
ganisation. These diagrammatic representations expose the
interplay between different behaviour types at varying levels
of attitude toward policy, where together these varieties can
help to strengthen the security posture of the organisation
as a mapping of the reach and influence of policy. As
we examine different subsets of the organisation, we can
compare the security culture in each group to understand
better how employees can be engaged to improve security
effectiveness.
Figures 1 to 5 all have four tetragons plotted, one for
each attitude level. The diagonal axes represent the fraction
of participants that exhibit each personality type, with the
centre of the diagram being 0%. To aid readability, Kiviat
plots are scaled to fill the entire chart. Hence, each corner
of the tetragon represents the fraction of participants of
that attitude level that exhibit the behaviour type of that
diagonal. As an example, for the case of Figure 1, the
blue tetragon represents participants at attitude Level 3
(‘Ad-hoc Knowledge and Application’). Of these, 4.5% (4
employees) exhibit as Egalitarian, 36% (29 employees) as
Individualist, 34% (27 employees) as Fatalist and 26% (20
employees) as Hierarchist behaviour types. This distribution
is very different to Level 5 attitude types, where 45% (212
employees) of participants belong to the Hierarchist group.
The quotients of participants labelled with each be-
haviour type and attitude level can be found in Table I.
While only a minority of participants exhibit attitude Levels
2 and 3, the variations between different divisions remain
strong enough for detailed analysis. The Kiviat diagrams
illustrate the relationship that employees may be having
with the IT-security infrastructure around them, knowingly
or unknowingly, as part of their working lives. These in-
teractions may be the result — or the root cause — of
their behaviour type, where security-related skills are also a
mediating factor.
It is interesting to note the difference in distributions
of behaviour types for different attitude levels. Individual-
ists have a larger proportion of lower attitude levels, and
Hierarchists emerge at the highest level, Level 5 (‘Active
Approach to Security’, as in Section III-B). Referring to the
attitude levels, there is a disparity between Levels 2-3 and
Levels 4-5, which immediately suggests not just that distinct
approaches to employee engagement would be needed, but
that the messaging would have to be crafted to match the
relationship that employees have with security and security
policy.
The strongest security attitude in the organisation overall
(Figure 1) is portrayed predominantly by Hierarchists and
Fatalists. The Hierarchists are akin to the idealised ‘security
champion’ (as we identified in the literature review in
Section II), someone who follows the rules and has security
skills to support them (being mostly at attitude Levels 4
and 5). The limited representation of Egalitarian behaviours
would suggest that individuals respond to security chal-
lenges in isolation (perhaps because of, or as the cause
of, the aforementioned barrier to working with policy). The
‘champions’ the organisation may need most may then be
team leaders or others who can bring people together and
motivate them through social activities and interactions.
These individuals do not need to have a high security
attitude level — most employees are at a high attitude level
already (Table I).
Behaviour type Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
Individualist 1.6% 4.8% 10.7% 14.1%
Egalitarian 0.5% 0.7% 5.6% 6.7%
Hierarchist 1.2% 3.3% 16.8% 34.9%
Fatalist 2.0% 4.4% 10.9% 21.9%
TABLE I. ABSOLUTE PERCENTAGES OF BEHAVIOUR TYPES COMPARED
WITH ATTITUDE LEVELS
We also examine a number of specific business divi-
sions/units in the organisation. This allows us to compare
security practice in different working environments in a
large and complex organisation.Business divisions in a large
organisation may differ in security culture to the point
where security champions need a different set of skills and
strengths to support protection of the overall organisation.
Behaviour type Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Total
Individualist 2.01% 8.72% 20.81% 25.50% 42.95%
Egalitarian 3.33% 0.00% 15.00% 26.67% 36.67%
Hierarchist 0.78% 1.17% 8.98% 20.70% 24.61%
Fatalist 2.48% 4.46% 10.40% 17.82% 32.18%
TABLE II. RESPONSE RATES TO FREE-TEXT RESPONSE QUESTIONS BY
BEHAVIOUR TYPE AND ATTITUDE LEVELS
To support analysis, we also refer to free-text responses
for the scenario-based questions (where this was optional
for participants, as described in Section III-C). The response
rates for optional comments are captured in Table II. We
see that response rates generally increase with security
attitude level for all behaviour types. That Hierarchists and
Fatalists make fewer comments, which is in keeping with
their behaviours — not questioning rules, either because
they adhere strictly to the policies or because they con-
sider security to be ‘somebody else’s job’. When discussing
specific business divisions in the following sections, we
refer to free-text responses that illustrate the qualities of
different kinds of approaches to organisational security.
Alongside each quote the participant’s behaviour type and
attitude level are included (as classified by their responses
to scenario questions, see Section III-B). Quotations allude
to aspects of security that already have their champion or
heroic deeds which save an otherwise unworkable situation,
in turn illustrating the benefits that employee input can
bring to the security culture of the organisation.
To support analysis, we focus on the four largest divi-
sions in the organisation: Sales and Services (292 partic-
ipants, Figure 2), Operations (152, Figure 3), Business (33,
Figure 4), and Finance & Professional services (47, Figure 5).
A. Analysis — Sales & Services division
Figure 2 shows the distribution of behaviour types for
each attitude level in the Sales & Services division. The
starkest difference compared to the organisation as a whole
(see Figure 1) is that approximately 63% (248 employees)
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IndividualistEgalitarian
Hierarchist Fatalist
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Fig. 2. Kiviat diagram of distributions of behaviour types for maturity
level 2 (red), 3 (blue), 4 (yellow), 5 (green) for the Sales & Service division.
of all participants from this department exhibit as Hier-
archists (vs. 40% for the whole organisation, statistically
significant with Fisher’s exact test with p < 0.01). The free-
text responses for this group included additional comments
regarding a scenario where — due to IT limitations — the
scenario’s protagonist is unable to securely send data to a
client. As an example:
“The employee is put in a no-win situation. If
the business permit flexible working then the only
allowable option here is for the data not to be sent.”
(Hierarchist, Level 3 / ‘Ad-hoc’)
Here the employee weighs up options, leaning toward
adherence to policy without compromising security. A Hi-
erarchist approach is for the most part the standard security
behaviour in this division. The second largest group repre-
sented at attitude Level 5 (‘Active Approach’) are Fatalists,
with a share of 20% (52 employees), with little Individualist
behaviour.
Considering the high representation of Hierarchists in
this division, it may be that prescribed security behaviours
may align with the context in this division, in that it
has the most outward-facing customer interaction of all of
the divisions, and predictable processes may be beneficial
for managing those interactions. There is an extremely
low representation of Egalitarians and Individualists in
this division; for one this means that we cannot be sure
whether security rules can be followed without impacting
business opportunities. Missed business opportunities are
noted elsewhere as a potential cost of being constrained by
organisational security controls [5]. Egalitarians and Indi-
vidualists may adapt security procedures in such situations
so as not to impact service.
B. Analysis — Operations division
A contrasting picture is found in the Operations division,
as shown in Figure 3. Here 55% (65 employees) of the
employees at attitude Level 5 are Fatalists. If Fatalists
IndividualistEgalitarian
Hierarchist FatalistLevel 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Fig. 3. Kiviat diagram of distributions of behaviour types for maturity
level 2 (red), 3 (blue), 4 (yellow), 5 (green) for the Operations division.
see their own actions as irrelevant to the preservation of
security, it may be that there is a separation from the larger
organisation’s security function. This may be a perceived
separation, or that employees perceive security as being
addressed elsewhere by someone else. That these employees
are at Level 5 (‘Active Approach’) implies that their security
understanding — which may or may not stand alongside
policy-compliant security — is superb. The high proportion
of Fatalists implies a disconnect; either the role of security
policy in the activities of the division is not clear and visible,
or there are insufficient efforts by the security function to
engage employees. The following quote, although referring
to policy, also mentions ‘best practice’, which is how IT
operates in reality:
“This question needs to be contextualised around
how important the information is and how im-
portant the consequent information security pol-
icy/policy level applied is. [...] Existing best practice
for teams [is] to share logins to certain systems
precisely because individual logins might not be
working. [...] I’m not sure what significance [a]
Password Manager has, because I’m not aware of
anyone in [Operations] using that facility. Most of
the tools are not even [tested and approved for
internal use], much less supported by something
as silly as a Password Manager.” (Fatalist, Level 3
/ ‘Ad-hoc’)
The individual is resigned to working with an IT system
that does not support business processes. The idea that
a password manager could be beneficial to the efficiency
of an employee is considered laughable, because of the
perceived state of the organisation’s systems. The employee’s
comments are useful to security managers simply for refer-
ring to IT as a larger element of the organisation, which
security ought to be aligned with. Similarly, the Fatalists
in this division may have ‘seen it all’, and accepted that
personal involvement in maintaining secure operations can
in some instances prove futile. This is emphasised by the
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high attitude Levels of Fatalists here — these employees
understand the consequences of their actions, and conclude
that even the most effective approaches to security still have
the capacity to fail in practice.
Another employee voices their opinion in a less exasper-
ated manner, when considering the expectation of having
to share passwords:
“Assuming he can change the password straight
after - that’s not too bad.” (scores equally as an
Individualist & Fatalist, Level 4 / ‘Policy Compli-
ant’)
This Individualist/Fatalist may not necessarily be con-
sidering policy, but nonetheless they are attempting to
maintain some level of security. That Individualists also
have a sizable representation in this division, albeit at
the lower levels, further implies that the division’s internal
security culture is driven by the role of security in highly-
skilled technology-related roles. Individualists and Fatalists
who fit security to their role may be more naturally able
to articulate the relevance of security to the goals they are
trying to achieve. Where there is a lack of Egalitarians, the
security function may compensate by talking to staff in the
division, arranging security surgeries etc., to learn from the
collective experiences of employees.
C. Analysis — Business division
IndividualistEgalitarian
Hierarchist FatalistLevel 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Fig. 4. Kiviat diagram of distributions of behaviour types for maturity
level 2 (red), 3 (blue), 4 (yellow), 5 (green) for the Business division.
A more diverse security culture can be seen in the
Business division. There is an approximately equal mix of
Egalitarians, Hierarchists and Individualists present here.
This alone suggests that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to en-
gaging with employees would not reach everyone in the di-
vision. The existence of diverse organisational (sub)cultures
can conversely be a source of resilience during times of
change [25]; this division may have valuable insights to
offer security managers through open dialogue, rather than
needing their guidance.
The division may have a good security posture that
accounts for new and unexpected security dilemmas —
if they can be addressed in a timely way. The free-text
responses from this division were varied, showing security
compromise as well as policy enforcement. When faced with
the prospect of having to share credentials in order to get
work done, one respondent comments:
“Assuming the colleagues are from the same team
and have the same clearance then they are equally
trustworthy.” (Fatalist, Level 2 / ‘Technically Con-
trolled’)
Another respondent stands up for the policy, declaring
that the actions offered to address the survey question’s
dilemma are not sufficient. When faced with the prospect of
transferring data over an insecure connection, s/he states:
“Would liked to have seen this option as a choice:
[additional option] Report the [connection] prob-
lem and sit back until its fixed. Ignoring the fact
that the work is crucial.” (Fatalist, Level 4 / ‘Policy
Compliant’)
Individualist responses to such a query are more bal-
anced. When faced with insecure choices for transferring
restricted data, one respondent shows a highly mature
attitude to policy (as on the maturity scale) while at the
same time risking actions that may be judged negatively by
security managers:
“It depends on the level of security on the [bring
your own device] laptop - if it’s password protected
and has encryption that is more acceptable. Online
services such as Dropbox should not generally be
used for confidential information, particularly if
not [approved for use].” (Individualist, Level 4 /
‘Policy Compliant’)
Egalitarians are by default social creatures; they thrive
in groups to solve problems. This division stands out as
it contains the highest proportion of Egalitarians from all
divisions considered. Their social leaning may well help
to engage others. A typical comment from an Egalitarian
person, when encountering an unlocked and unattended
workstation, is:
“[I would] send an email from the user of the
unlocked machine to the team, offering to buy ice
creams for everyone.” (Egalitarian, Level 5 / ‘Active
Approach’)
Although there is a lot of variation in behaviour types in
this division, it could be useful to engage employees here
in a number of different ways to capture all of their ex-
periences (as demonstrated by the quotes above), certainly
before any attempts to reinforce policy from the top down.
The large percentage of attitude Level 2 and 3 Fatalists may
however benefit from having a clear, workable process that
employees can follow; those at higher levels can inform how
that can be achieved in a way that does not hinder reaching
business goals.
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IndividualistEgalitarian
Hierarchist FatalistLevel 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Fig. 5. Kiviat diagram of distributions of behaviour types for maturity
level 2 (red), 3 (blue), 4 (yellow), 5 (green) for the Finance & Prof. Services
division.
D. Analysis — Finance & Professional Services division
Considering the Finance & Professional Services divi-
sion, the data shown in Figure 5 illustrates that the predomi-
nant behaviour type is Individualist: approximately 40% (26
employees) of attitude Levels 3, 4 and 5 display this type.
In this division, there is a discrete switch from Fatalist to
Individualist from attitude Level 3 (‘Ad-hoc Knowledge and
Application’) upwards — this is statistically significant, with
Pearson’s r = −0.91, n = 45, p < 0.01. Both approaches are
individualised, but differ in that the former experience pre-
scribed “Inequality” and the latter act toward “Equality” [1].
It might be that those employees whose jobs are constrained
by IT are relying on the organisation to ensure security for
all, whereas those with an understanding of policy feel that
they own how it is applied.
A top-down, prescriptive approach to engaging employ-
ees may fail to achieve results here, where Individualists
at higher attitude levels may have an increasingly clearer
understanding of how security policy fits with business
goals. Indeed, communicating more security-related infor-
mation to those at lower levels of security attitude may set
employees up for cognitive overload and embarrassment [5].
V. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
To revisit the research challenges outlined in Sec-
tion II-B, we found that separate divisions of the organ-
isation exhibited different distributions of both behaviour
type and attitude level, immediately indicating that a “one
size fits all” approach to messaging around security would
achieve mixed results. By combining behaviour types and
attitude levels (as defined in the maturity model sum-
marised in Section III-B), we were able to reason about
differences in the security experiences of distinct groups as
well as the dynamic between employees and the security
provisions available to them.
Similarly, employees’ free-text responses indicate that
they can offer insights about the security challenges they
face and how to craft solutions for their working environ-
ment — ‘champions’ who can improve security can then be
found in different places. For example, staff in the Opera-
tions division tended toward Fatalist behaviour, where se-
curity would be something taken care of ‘by somebody else’.
Given that this included Fatalists with high attitude levels,
any enhancements to security here may look at ensuring
timely support from IT security representatives to leverage
the high risk understanding seen in the division to spot
risks as they arise and mobilise support. Conversely, in the
Finance & Professional Services division more Hierarchists
would be desired to improve the understanding of policy.
Security improvement must leverage the existing security
culture; the recruitment of security champions needs to be
tailored to specific groups and divisions.
The sample of the workforce studied here has few Egal-
itarians (see Table I) — it implies that there are few oppor-
tunities or little interest in socialising security. Developing a
two-way security dialogue between security managers and
employees can promote the alignment of security policy
and process with the working environment [3]. Identifying
individual and team trust dynamics could identify the most
effective ways to engage in that dialogue, as security chal-
lenges may be resolved at a local team level as much as by
following prescribed policy directives [19]. The organisation
studied here is a large organisation with thousands of staff;
having a distinct security function in a large, complex work
environment may indirectly result in a Fatalist approach of
security being ‘not my job’ (as hinted at for the Operations
division), so there would be value in examining diverse
organisations to determine the effect of organisation size
and the viability of engagement activities.
A limitation of the analysis conducted here is that the
data collected is a snapshot of the security experience at
one point in time, and does not account for how security
processes have developed over time up to that point, or
any disruptive events which may have occurred within the
organisation (such as a merger, change in applicable regu-
lations, large-scale IT renewal, etc.). However, if events were
disruptive enough to result in a change in the experience
of security (e.g., adoption of another company’s policies),
employees may be inclined to comment on the change
from their perspective when engaged in an activity such
as the survey described here. Similarly, collection of survey
responses over time can build a picture of security culture
development, not least to understand the impact of security
awareness initiatives.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS AND
RESEARCHERS
For the policy owner, our work reaffirms the need for
security policy to be relevant to work activities and for
employees to understand the risks that relate directly to
those activities. Furthermore, policy should not be seen as
an immovable object; when circumstances in the organi-
sation change, the security policy should be revisited. The
best sources of information for the policy owner are the em-
ployees: regular, direct, two-way interaction with individuals
from all departments will enable policy to remain aligned
with reality. The correct policy might not be known, but
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colleagues can be engaged to identify where it falls short
and identify the underlying causes of non-compliance. A
policy is only workable if employees are involved in shaping
it, and employees can accept that they have to ‘do the right
thing’.
Our recommendation to security awareness profession-
als and researchers is to target awareness content to spe-
cific security behaviour-types and attitude-levels. Any one
mode of engagement will resonate best with a different
portion of the employee population. Encouraging meaning-
ful responses from employees may require a combination
of different approaches, such as surveys, workshops, and
individual interactions. The tailoring of advice does not
need to be guesswork — engaging with groups of employees
in the right way can immediately inform a picture of the
security culture across the organisation. Ultimately, an un-
derstanding of relevant risks and work-related motivations
could make targeted interventions much more successful. If
security doesn’t work for people, it doesn’t work.
VII. CONCLUSION
Here we have analysed 608 employee responses to a
security behaviour survey deployed in a large partner or-
ganisation. The survey captured attitude to security policy
on a scale of maturity, and based on answer choices
would assign one of four behaviour types as an indicator
of the individual’s approach to managing security in the
workplace. Responses were analysed and four business
divisions were examined in detail, including Operations
and Business divisions. We found that by combining these
two dimensions we can characterise the quality of security
policy for groups of employees. Analysis of 189 optional
free-text comments linked to the survey further suggests
that those who follow policy can contribute to effective
security, but so can those who question policy, socialise
solutions, or would otherwise expect security to be part of
their productive work if it was important. These various
security cultures all have the potential to help improve
security for the whole organisation, where here we have
identified a range of security heroes for security managers
to engage.
The ideal type of security hero engagement for the
organisation studied here would be a composite of different
approaches: it cannot be identified by one specific set of
traits, but rather is entirely dependent on the social context
it manifests in. Individuals may act alone or together, with
policy in mind or in isolation from it. The methodology
presented here, combining security attitude and security
behaviour, is a useful tool for investigating the interplay
between policy and action. Attempting to narrowly define
and promote the characteristics of a security champion is
counterproductive, as it simplifies the challenge of involv-
ing employees in the process of improving organisational
security.
Future work will see the survey exercise repeated with
more organisations over time, across sectors. This will fur-
ther inform the understanding of how employees as a group
or workforce respond to security policy and its implementa-
tion. With that, work will also look to identify interventions
based upon user feedback, to determine if improvements to
security can effect lasting behaviour change. It may be that
survey can be designed in such a way as to elicit information
about not only generally secure behaviours and behaviours
which align with policy, but also those behaviours which
are acceptably secure given limiting restrictions in the
particular work environment being assessed.
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